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Abstract
Conflict has marked civilization from Biblical times to the present day. Each of us, with
our different and competing interests, and our desires to pursue those interests, have over time
wronged another person. Not surprisingly then, forgiveness is a concern of individuals and
groups—communities, countries, religious groups, races—yet it is a complex idea that
philosophers, theologians, political scientists, and psychologists have grappled with. Some have
argued that forgiveness is a therapeutic means for overcoming guilt, pain, and anger. Forgiveness
is often portrayed as a coping mechanism—how often we hear the phrase, “forgive and forget,”
as an arrangement to help two parties surmount the complications of disagreement. But
forgiveness is not simply a modus vivendi; the ability to forgive and conversely to ask for
forgiveness, is counted as an admirable trait and virtue.
This essay will explore the nature of forgiveness, which in Christian dogma is often
posited as an unqualified virtue. The secular world has appropriated the Christian notion of
forgiveness as such a virtue—but are there instances wherein offering forgiveness is morally
inappropriate or dangerous? I will consider the situations in which forgiveness, understood in
this essay as the overcoming of resentment, may not be a virtue—when perhaps maintaining
resentment is as virtuous, if not more virtuous, than forgiving. I will explain the various ethical
frameworks involved in understanding forgiveness as a virtue, and the relationship between
them. I will argue that within Divine Command Theory forgiveness is a virtue—and thus morally
right—because God commands it. This ethical system has established forgiveness as
unconditional, an idea which has been adopted into popular culture. With virtue ethics in mind,
which holds virtues to be those traits which benefit the person who possesses them, contributing
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to the good life, I will argue unqualified forgiveness is not always a virtue, as it will not always
benefit the victim.
Because there is no way to avoid wrongdoing, humans are confronted with the question
of forgiveness with every indiscretion. Its limits, its possibilities, its relationship to one’s
character—forgiveness is a concern of all people at some time if for no other reason than the
plain fact that the past cannot be undone. I will be evaluating the idea of forgiveness as a virtue,
in contrast to its counterpart, resentment. How can forgiveness be a response to evil, a way to
renounce resentment, and a means of creating a positive self-narrative? And what happens when
a sense of moral responsibility is impossible to reconcile with the Christian (and now,
secularized imperative of) forgiveness? Is it ever not virtuous to forgive?
In an attempt to answer that question I will argue that there are indeed times when
forgiveness is not a virtue, specifically: when forgiveness compromises one’s own self-respect;
when it is not compatible with respect for the moral community; and when the offender is
unapologetic. The kind of offense I have in mind is a dehumanizing one, one that intends to
diminish another person’s worth or humanity. These are moral injuries, to which I will argue
resentment is a better response than forgiveness when the three qualifications cannot be met.

1
Introduction
The short story “The Capital of the World” by Ernest Hemingway begins with the telling
of a joke:
Madrid is full of boys named Paco, which is diminutive of the name Fransisco, and there is a
Madrid joke about a father who came to Madrid and inserted an advertisement in the personal
columns of El Liberal which said: PACO MEET ME AT HOTEL MANTANA NOON TUESDAY ALL IS
FORGIVEN PAPA and how a squadron of Guardia Civil had to be called to disperse the eight
hundred young men who answered the advertisement.1

The joke is about the popularity of the name “Paco,” but as the eminent theologian and
public scholar Miroslav Volf has pointed out, it only makes sense because of the ubiquity of the
human desire to be forgiven.2 Eight hundred Pacos showed up at the Hotel that Tuesday
afternoon, but more significantly, eight hundred young men were longing for forgiveness. The
joke demonstrates the powerful desire to right our wrongs, and restore relationships. For Volf,
Hemingway’s joke shows the value placed on forgiveness because it is the “uniquely important
way we deal with wrongdoing.”3 The significance ascribed to forgiveness and those who
dispense it can only be understood in conjunction with an explanation of forgiveness as a virtue,
both theologically and in the secularly.
I have looked for and found, I think, a modest, but important function of religion that
allows us to understand Paco’s story, in a world that needs to ameliorate conflicts over values,
rituals, and interests—material, moral, economic, political, and personal. This function is
forgiveness. There are no other social institutions or cultural sets of values that do more than
religions to encourage, organize, ritualize, and facilitate the resolution of hatreds, and
resentments caused by the perception of having been painfully wronged.

1

Hemingway, The Capital of the World, 49.
Volf, Free of Charge, 127.
3
Ibid., 128.
2

2
While religions have much to say about forgiveness, so too do secular disciplines such as
philosophy, psychology, and sociology. Theologically, forgiveness is related to doctrinal issues
of original sin and human fallibility, at least in the Christian context, which will be the focus of
my research, as it has been the focus of most of the existing research that explores that central
relationship between Christianity and forgiveness. Further, in order to minimize the scope of my
inquiry, I have chosen Christianity as it is the dominant religious tradition in Western culture—
especially in the United States.
Because one major Christian belief is that all humans are born sinners who must be
forgiven by God in order to attain ultimate salvation, the dynamic of repentance and forgiveness
is fixed in Christian thought. Through a relationship with Jesus Christ and atonement for one’s
inherited sin by way of a strong Christian faith, lifestyle, good works, or confession,
forgiveness—what may be considered the greatest form of God’s love—will be bestowed.
Christians find the strength to forgive others through the undying desire to be forgiven when they
themselves stand before God. We might say that secular disciplines and scholars are concerned
with the benefits of forgiveness, such as the ability to reconcile interpersonal relationships and
alleviate crippling hate and tension within society. But perhaps forgiveness owes its invariable
prominence and support in popular culture and secular society to its vitality in Christian doctrine.
But as every virtue taken to an extreme may become a vice, Christianity has not only
encouraged forgiveness for harms done, but it also may be the case that Christian teachings not
only encourage forgiveness but may enforce unconditional forgiveness. One way or the other, so
important are theological functions regarding forgiveness that, for the purpose of this paper, I
would like to cite religion as a manifestation and mechanism of and by which we atone for our
wrong-doings, and by so doing resolve both our psychological and sociological feelings of guilt
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and shame, and by which we find ourselves able to live together with a variety of other and
different believers and non-believers in multicultural and diverse societies. The danger, I will
argue, is not in forgiveness itself, but in the way theological tenets of forgiveness are unqualified
and the adoption of these principles by society at-large.
Conflict has marked civilization from the earliest records of human history to the present
day. Most people would agree that all humans, with our different and competing interests, and
our desires to pursue those interests, have over time wronged another person. Not surprisingly
then, forgiveness is a concern of individuals and groups—communities, countries, religious
groups, races—yet it is a complex idea that philosophers, theologians, political scientists, and
psychologists have grappled with. Some have argued that forgiveness is a therapeutic means for
overcoming guilt, pain, and anger. Forgiveness is often portrayed as a coping mechanism—we
often hear the phrase, “forgive and forget,” as an arrangement to help two parties surmount the
complications of disagreement. But forgiveness is not simply a modus vivendi; most people
count the ability to forgive and conversely to ask for forgiveness, as an admirable trait and virtue.
Forgiveness is generally viewed as a positive counter-phenomenon to the inevitable
instances of wrong-doing that persist in all societies. In our culture, people often regard the
degree to which one is willing to accept another’s apology is indicative of his or her general
disposition. One who refuses to grant forgiveness may be called callous, bitter, and resentful. On
the other hand, the person who offers forgiveness quickly and indiscriminately may be called
spineless and cowardly.
Because most people regard wrongdoing as pervasive and perhaps inevitable, humans are
confronted with the question of forgiveness with every indiscretion. Its limits, its possibilities, its
relationship to one’s character—forgiveness is a concern of nearly all people at some time if for
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no other reason than the plain fact that the past cannot be undone. Forgiveness is humanity’s
response to this frustrating reality. Hannah Arendt commented on forgiveness as a response to
the irreversibility of the past, “the possible redemption from the predicament of irreversibility—
of being unable to undo what one has done though one did not, and could not, have known what
he was doing—is the faculty of forgiving.”4
Bishop Joseph Butler, an eighteenth-century English theologian and philosopher who
wrote important treatises on resentment and forgiveness, gave two seminal sermons regarding
forgiveness as a virtue. Butler began both sermons with an excerpt from Matthew:
Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy:
But I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that
hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you. 5
“Love thy enemy” is arguably one of the most difficult tasks set forth for Christians—perhaps
this is the reason we exalt those with the ability to do this; we need only to look at the Holocaust,
terrorism, war, and genocide to know that the command to love our enemies is often lost
amongst rage and hatred. But Butler believed that to love those who have wronged us is in fact
the “law of our nature.” In his sermon, he used a hypothetical situation a person appearing before
God “naked and without disguise before the judge of all the earth, to give account of your
behavior towards your fellow creatures.”6 Therefore, the reader is compelled to reflect on his or
her ability to forgive—and according to Butler, there can be nothing more dreadful than the
reflection that one had been implacable, without mercy. How can one ask for the forgiving spirit
to be exercised in his or her favor? Then, Butler posits the opposite: a good person comes before
God knowing he had been “meek, forgiving, and merciful; that he had in simplicity of heart been
ready to pass over offenses against himself,” this person remembers the declaration that “if ye
4
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forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will likewise forgive you” and is relieved.7
Butler uses this scenario to demonstrate the necessity of forgiveness, pardon, reconciliation of
our fellow persons, as we hope for the absolution of our own sins, for peace of mind in death,
and for divine mercy.
Reconciliation is surely an artifact of evil—given that evil seems ubiquitous, how can we
mitigate it? Forgiveness, as the contemporary philosopher Charles Griswold writes, “is a prime
candidate in part because it does not reduce either to resigned acceptance or to deluded
avoidance…how can one accept fully that moral evil has been done and yet see its perpetrator in
a way that…in a sense…simultaneously forswears revenge, aspires to give up resentment, and
incorporates the injury suffered into a narrative of self that allows the victim and even the
narrator to flourish?”8 Griswold’s claim represents the popular view that the ability to forgive the
injuries befallen to oneself might have redeeming qualities, while resentment and revenge are
often conflated with a sentiment of something suspect, something used to inflict pain on another
person.
In this paper, I will challenge popular notions of forgiveness as a virtue, in contrast to its
counterpart, resentment. How can forgiveness be a response to evil, a way to renounce
resentment, and a means of creating a positive self-narrative? Might we look at those who are, as
Butler says, “meek, forgiving, and merciful…ready to pass over offenses against himself” as
morally irresponsible? How can we forgive all evils unilaterally? Must not we discern what evils
can and cannot be forgiven? What happens when a sense of moral responsibility is impossible to
reconcile with Butler’s imperative of forgiveness? Is it ever not virtuous to forgive?

7
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I will begin with a broad introduction to the notions of forgiveness and resentment,
focusing explicitly on the way the two share an arena and can be considered as the two possible
responses to an injury against oneself. I will then clarify the different ethical theories and
perspectives that will be relevant to this discussion. The next section will demonstrate the
weightiness of my questions by way of a discussion of the irreversibility of time, and the ways in
which the past is immutable. Following these introductory sections I will clarify the kind of
transgressions that are at stake in my inquiry, namely those that violate the moral laws and result
in moral injuries. From there, the paper will move into a discussion of forgiveness from social
and psychological perspectives, from Christian perspectives, and briefly clarify what forgiveness
is not, in order to paint as clear and comprehensive a picture of forgiveness as a virtue. I will
argue that there are two types of forgiveness—conditional and unconditional which will be
important to my own argument against unconditioned forgiveness. The next sections examine
resentment from both social and psychological, and theological perspectives. I then present
several defenses of resentment from the existing research on forgiveness, as they form the
foundation of my own contributions to the existing dialogue.
Finally, as I construct my own argument, I will claim that there exists such a concept as
an unforgiveable evil, which dehumanizes others and attempt to diminish their moral standing
(and offer potential arguments to the contrary). Then I will develop my original contribution to
the present discourse, an argument based on the limits of forgiveness in the face of
dehumanizing, unforgiveable evil—specifically that there are three times in which it is not
virtuous to forgive: when forgiveness is not compatible with self-respect; respect for others in the
moral community; and when the offender is unapologetic. The paper will close with a
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consideration of potential counter arguments to the three instances that I have put forth, and final
concluding remarks.

Introduction to the Concepts of Forgiveness and Resentment
Many analysts of forgiveness introduce and define the concept in relation to resentment.
Hannah Arendt described forgiveness as a way of escaping the cycle of resentment and revenge.
To forgive, according to Arendt, is to renounce rage and bitterness and lay the foundation for an
amended relationship with the wrongdoer; this makes it something unique and notable about
human life.9 Arendt thought forgiveness did not receive enough attention as a secular matter as it
was presumed to be primarily theologically oriented. To be sure, the questions of forgiveness,
sin, evil, and divine clemency, are fundamental to most religions. But iniquities and
transgressions are also human problems and transcend the bounds of religion, so they must be
addressed by faithful and non-faithful alike as victims and as perpetrators. Thus the problem of
forgiveness is not only a theological one (though one’s propensity to forgive is often driven by
theology), but one that should concern all persons, regardless of faith.
Joseph Butler is thought by some to be the first person to analyze the attitudes of
forgiveness and resentment in relation to each other. Butler was concerned with the passion of
resentment, and how an omnipotent and loving God could allow us to express such an unloving
attitude.10 For Butler, the excess of resentment—not the attitude itself—is problematic, and we
need forgiveness to overcome resentment before it dominates us. Resentment, for Butler, does in
fact express one’s commitment to morality, but one should not be dominated by any passion
(such as resentment), and thus forgiveness is that virtue which checks resentment.

9
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This paper draws upon Butler’s influential model of forgiveness. To be sure, other
models of forgiveness exist. But forgiveness understood as the repression and rejection of
resentment will be the best lens through which to examine the dichotomy between the virtuous
and non-virtuous conceptions of both forgiveness and resentment. It should be noted that
Butler’s model tells us something about the way in which resentment emerges as an attitude. To
suggest that forgiveness must prevail over resentment suggests resentment is a natural—and
according to Butler, not inherently wrong—response to injury. From this we might conclude that
in order for forgiveness to take place, a victim must first feel resentment.
Moreover, the presence of the resentful attitude implies at the very minimum an
acknowledgement of the injury as wrong—the transgression has been recognized as such. P.F.
Strawson maintains that forgiveness is related to resentment in this way. He explains that asking
for forgiveness is to know one is resented, because seeking forgiveness is to “partly acknowledge
that the attitude displayed in our action was such as might properly be resented; partly to
repudiate that attitude. To forgive is to accept the repudiation, to forswear the resentment.”11 We
see then that for both the offender and the victim (at least in cases where the offender is
repentant, or asking for forgiveness), in order for forgiveness to transpire, first an
acknowledgment of the injury and its immorality must occur, followed by the resentful attitude.
Only after resentment has been established can forgiveness overcome it.
Many theorists have followed closely in Butler’s theoretical footsteps. For example,
Kathleen Dean Moore has argued that “the attitude of forgiveness is characterized by…the lack
of personal resentment for the injury.”12 Likewise, Martin Hughes echoes Butler in his
description of forgiveness as the “cancellation of deserved hostilities and substitution of

11
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friendlier attitudes.”13 His use of the concepts of “cancellation,” and “substitution,” are directly
related to Butler’s model of forgiveness as a replacement for resentment.
But not all cases where resentment is overcome counts as instances of forgiveness. Jeffrie
Murphy has described forgiveness in accordance with Butler’s model as the “resolute
overcoming of the anger and hatred that are naturally directed toward a person who has done one
an unjustified and non-excused moral injury.”14 But Murphy expands on this idea by qualifying
it with the stipulation that “ceasing to resent will not constitute forgiveness unless it is done for a
moral reason. Forgiveness is not the overcoming of resentment simpliciter; it is rather this:
forswearing resentment on moral grounds.15 Murphy has adopted Butler’s view and offered an
addition to it by suggesting forgiveness is not just overcoming hatred, anger, and resentment
because these passions can be dangerously excessive, but the act of forgiveness must also be on
moral grounds.
The concept of forgiveness resists any one precise definition, but the following definition
comes close to embodying it: “[forgiveness is] a reduction of negative responses and the
production of positive one toward an event, person or group…change toward a perceived
transgressor…a process often involving decreased motivation to retaliate against a (perceived)
offender, decreasing motivation to maintain estrangement from the offender, and increasing
motivation toward conciliation and goodwill for the offender.”16 Forgiveness in these contexts is
seen as a virtue and “virtues are always thought to be praiseworthy motives for action…virtuous
acts and motives are things that we want to encourage because we strive to be virtuous
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persons.”17 All of these components are at least in part related to resentment. Forgiveness, as a
virtue, in the wake of Butler’s sermon, has come to be defined as that which overcomes and
represses resentment, so that the two attitudes are juxtaposed.

Ethical Frameworks
Because I have suggested that forgiveness is a virtue, I should frame my argument in the
context of different ethical systems which make it possible to think about the nature of what is
virtuous. How do the various thinkers and theories that I will draw upon fit within the framework
of meta-ethics? If forgiveness is a virtue, it would be useful to have a clear idea of the nature of
this type of virtue and how it reflects on our moral character.
As Aurel Kolnai states in his paper, Forgiveness, “forgiveness is pre-eminently an ethical
subject, and a paper written about it cannot help being a paper in ethics.”18 But others have
argued forgiveness is a strictly religious concept, not an ethical one. Paul Lehmann claims
forgiveness is comprehensible in the context of the relation between God and man, “marked by
the awesome holiness of God, by man’s offense against this holiness, by man’s guilt, and by
man’s need for assurance that his sin against God has been pardoned and that right relations
between God and man have been restored.”19 So here are two competing frameworks from which
we can consider forgiveness: one I will argue is closest to Divine Command theory, the other, the
virtue ethics. Both are ethical systems—Kolnai is correct in arguing there is something ethical at
stake. More specifically, the unconditional status of forgiveness in Christian thought operates
from Divine Command theory, whereas my conception of conditioned forgiveness is situated
within virtue ethics, and I will examine the nature of forgiveness as a virtue.
17
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I am critiquing unconditional forgiveness as understood through Divine Command
Theory, a meta-ethical theory, which proposes that an action's status as morally good is
dependent on whether it is commanded by God. What is moral is determined by what God
commands, so to be moral is to follow God’s commands. In one reading of the notions of
forgiveness, Divine Command seems to say that forgiveness is unconditional. So Divine
Command theory has provided the foundation for the belief in unconditional forgiveness that I
will argue has trickled out into popular culture. As Meirlys Lewis has claimed, there is a logical
dimension to forgiveness where it is “not just an occasional requirement, but where it is an
absolute requirement…structured and defined by certain beliefs about God, about the love of
God, the mercy of God, divine grace and compassion.”20 Kierkegaard presents a particular
analysis of Christian love and likewise Christian forgiveness with secular love and forgiveness.
The uniqueness of Christian forgiveness lies in its “unconditionality and in that it maintains a
constant unchanging relation between the believer and the trespasser. Christian forgiveness does
not require the repentance of the one who is to be forgiven. It does not require reference to
mitigating circumstances, to the possible ill consequences of forgiveness. It does not require a
moral justification of itself.”21 For believers, this makes forgiveness an eternal obligation, a
religious demand. The process of forgiveness involves perceptions about the relationship
between God and the world which color how one perceives relations with other humans. There is
no consideration of the moral, conceptions about “sin, primordial evil, the distance between what
is worthless, insignificant and what is infinitely good, perfect, are inseparable from the language
of prayer and confession.”22

20
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Another way of approaching forgiveness is through ethics, and this is the context in
which my argument has been developed. Kolnai has talked about forgiveness not as a “strict
obligation,” but a quasi-obligation which has its source in virtue, and reveals virtue. “It may be
looked upon…as the epitome and culmination of morality.”23 And as Lewis argues, “the more
virtuous I am, then, the more disposed I am to forgive.”24 Thus, forgiveness is not a duty, but it is
a virtue. I am not arguing that forgiveness is always wrong, but I am arguing that from a certain
ethical framework, virtue ethics, unconditional forgiveness subsumed under Divine Command
theory, is flawed because it cannot account for circumstantial nuances, and is problematic when
applied without qualifications.
Virtue ethics supposes that the possession of virtues, understood as deep and relatively
permanent traits of character and intellect, is a criterion of moral and non-moral worth: the
virtues are necessary if one is to be a good person.25 And, one of the features of ancient thought
is that virtues benefit those who possess them. For Butler, an important benefit of forgiveness is
the role that it plays in not letting our resentment towards wrongdoing go beyond appropriate
limits. It is believed that if rightful resentment goes for too long unchecked, it will be so
consuming that the person doing the resenting will suffer. An Aristotelian approach to virtue
ethics adopts this principle, and defines the virtues in terms of their contribution to the person’s
thriving; what makes a trait a virtue is because it is a constituent of the good life for human
beings.26 With this conception of virtue in mind, I will argue against unqualified forgiveness as a
virtue, as it will not always be good for the possessor, particularly in relation to the three
qualifications I have in mind.

23
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Of course, Divine Command theory and virtue ethics are not the only two ethical systems
at work. The final consideration is of conditional forgiveness, which comes out of a
deontological understanding of forgiveness. To say unconditional forgiveness is always wrong
would be to overstate my argument. Rather, I will demonstrate three specific times when
unconditional forgiveness is morally wrong. My criticism of unqualified forgiveness in these
three instances is closely aligned with the deontological rhetoric of Kant. Kant’s categorical
imperative is that on whatever maxim one has based his or her actions, one would also want that
maxim be a universal law. In fact, in Resurrection, Lewis has argued that Leo Tolstoy comes
close to admitting that if unconditional forgiveness were to be universal law, then the result
would be complete anarchy27 Forgiveness under the three circumstances I have described—when
self-respect is compromised, when the moral community is threatened, and when the offender is
unrepentant—cannot be universal law, perhaps only conditioned forgiveness could succeed as
such a maxim.
Finally, the utilitarian ethic enters the conversation when we consider theories on the
emotional benefits of forgiveness. A utilitarian view would regard forgiveness as a virtue if
dispensing forgiveness will bring the greatest happiness to the greatest number. In Utilitarianism,
John Stuart Mill stated, "In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of
the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbor as oneself,
constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.”28 Our own desire to be forgiven then—
religious injunctions aside—would constitute the foundation for the utilitarian view. Further
utilitarian rhetoric purports that we learn to associate virtuous acts with pleasure. Thus, we learn
to enjoy doing virtuous acts, which in turn will bring us pleasure. The positive associations with
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forgiveness that are understood as gaining peace of mind, closure, and letting go of resentment,
categorize forgiveness as a virtue because it comes with a feeling of pleasure. I will refute these
utilitarian-esque claims because they lack the ethical considerations that constitute a moral
understanding and dispensation of forgiveness.

Irreversibility of the Past
Another important aspect in analyzing resentment and forgiveness is addressing how they
relate to the resolution of evil and the irreversibility of time. In his book, Mea Culpa, Nicholas
Tavuchis refers to the human ability to apologize as “paradoxical and talismanic,” which is an
observation worth explicating. Tavuchis argues that if the primary task of an apology is to
resolve discord and restore the moral order by eliminating the effects of past conflict or injury,
then the system of apology and forgiveness cannot be successful. Why? Tavuchis, like Arendt,
rightly and simply perceives that “because an apology, no matter how sincere or effective, does
not and cannot undo what has been done. And yet, in a mysterious way and according to its own
logic, this is precisely what it manages to do”29 Arendt posits that forgiveness “serves to undo
the deeds of the past, whose ‘sins’ hang like Damocles’ sword over every new generation.”30
It is on an experiential level that we know the feeling of resentment and the process of
forgiveness, as part of the weightiness of the human condition. When injury occurs, we tend to
consider the virtues of forgiveness as a given, but the entire process is much more paradoxical. It
is humanity’s attempt to emotionally, socially, psychologically, and religiously reverse what is
fait accompli; this is of course, metaphysically impossible. And the task is more difficult when
utterly disgraceful acts of evil are under consideration. Yet society constantly encourages us to
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forgive: therapists prescribe it, and the Bible commands it. But for a person in the wake of
unimaginable moral evil, is forgiveness too much to ask? The mere metaphysical truth that the
past remains in the past, untouchable to us, creates a significant barrier for many when
confronted with the pressure of forgiveness. Saint Augustine advised, cum dilectione hominum et
odio vitiorum—“with love for mankind and hatred of sins,” or popularly, “hate the sin and not
the sinner.” But is this a lofty, unattainable ideal? As a moral theory, Saint Augustine’s work
underlies much of the discourse on forgiveness both religious and secular. But in practice, I will
argue Tavuchis’ paradox more closely mirrors the basic human experience—we cannot reverse
time but in offering forgiveness we attempt to erase the effects of past transgressions, and in a
way, undo it. I hope this brief discussion of the irreversibility of time demonstrates the ongoing
significance of my question, as all people must face this metaphysical reality.

Moral Evil, Moral Order, Moral Injury
The dynamics of forgiveness and resentment generally involve what many thinkers call
moral evil. Moral evil, in the way that I will use it, refers to a transgression of the norms of the
moral community. In his seminal essay, Freedom and Resentment, P.F. Strawson defines
forgiveness and resentment as two “reactive attitudes,” towards others in the moral community.31
In order to have such a reactive attitude toward another moral agent, the wronged person must
believe the perpetrator intentionally committed the act—his argument is that we can only express
resentment and forgiveness toward those who we believe to be culpable moral agents. The forces
of nature, for instance, cannot understand the moral value or integrity of its victims, but we do
believe other humans are capable of doing so.

31
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An attitude of resentment is connected to morality. Resentment can be considered to be a
response to a personal affront, some hurtful act committed against us. Because we believe we are
entitled to treatment in accordance with our moral value (as sentient beings in the moral
community), we are insulted when we believed someone who has wronged us has disregarded
our status as such. Resentment then might be understood as a response to the “symbolic
communications” of moral injury—“intentional wrongdoing insults us and attempts…to degrade
us—and thus it involves a kind of injury that is not merely tangible and sensible. It is moral
injury, and we care about such injuries.”32 Here it should be noted that this sort of injury, from an
observer’s perspective, might seem completely subjective—the extent to which one feels insulted
often is related to one’s own conception of his or her self-worth. Admittedly, the degree of the
response to an injury can vary in each particular circumstance from indignation to devastation.
But the belief that the injury was intentional—and that because we exist in the moral community,
it has diminished our status—is important to the discussion of forgiveness and resentment.
The reaction to a moral injury often manifests itself in what some have called “moral
anger.”33 Moral anger refers to the circumstances wherein the motivation behind resentment is
the “desire for the moral order to be restored…moral commitment is not merely a matter of
intellectual allegiance; it requires an emotional allegiance as well, for a moral person is not
simply a person who holds an abstract belief that certain things are wrong. The moral person is
also motivated to do something about the wrong.”34 Resentment then can be a type of response to
moral anger, wherein the injured party remains angry due to an allegiance to the moral order.
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Forgiveness, as the opposite of resentment, is also deeply tied to the moral order. The
ability to forgive a gratuitous personal injury or insult begins with the recognition of the
perpetrator as a moral agent, as Strawson believed. Strawson has contrasted the reactive attitude
with an objective attitude, which he argues should preclude reactive attitudes such as resentment.
Objectivizing others—not engaging with the other as a moral agent—indicates one is “not
relating to the other as a fellow human…Being susceptible to anger and resentment is
inextricably tied to participation in the general framework of human life.”35 As in the attitude of
resentment, we must consider this person accountable—at the very least we must consider the
offender to be a person. Margaret Holmgren has described these conditions:
The cognitive component of an attitude of forgiveness includes an acute or salient
awareness of the offender as a sentient being who is capable of experiencing happiness
and misery…subject to various needs, pressures, confusions in life and is vulnerable to
error…recognition that the offender is valuable human being with a moral status equal to
our own…with the same basic capacity for growth, choice, and awareness that we
have…in forgiveness we will have an experiential understanding of these salient features
of the offender as a person and an appreciation of their overriding importance.36
It is Holmgren’s argument that recognizing these features of the offender, which make the person
an equal member of the moral community, should have “overriding importance,” that will
become less clear and more contentious as I examine instances of potentially unforgivable
instances of evil.
This discussion of the moral order is to elucidate that both possible responses to moral
evil seem to require at least the recognition of the victim and the offender as morally responsible
agents. Whether or not this understanding of moral agency indicates forgiveness is always
virtuous and right, or whether it means resentment can be morally responsible is the complicated
matter at hand.
35
36

Brudholm, Resentment’s Virtue,11.
Holmgren, Forgiveness and Retribution, 35.

18
Forgiveness: Social and Psychological Understandings
The significance ascribed to forgiveness and those who dispense it, as seen in the
introductory story about Paco and his father, can only be understood in conjunction with an
explanation of forgiveness as a virtue, beginning with the social, psychological, and
philosophical reasons why it is regarded as virtuous.
Robert C. Roberts is the first to have ascribed a human virtue to the concept of
forgiveness. Forgivingness, as Roberts calls it, is a trait embodied by those who “tend not to
retain anger, bitterness, or resentment after being wronged.”37 This person overcomes the anger
felt in response to injury, while not forfeiting his or her conviction that what was done was
wrong. Overcoming anger and resentfulness requires time and thought, and replacing it with a
more constructive and positive attitude.38 Forgivingness is a virtue because what it replaces is not
a virtue; according to Roberts, anger, resentment, and persistent grievance are so destructive that
the ability to surmount these feelings by way of a forgiving attitude is virtuous. Virtue ethics
supposes that the possession of virtues, understood as deep and relatively permanent traits of
character and intellect is a sign of moral worth; forgivingness operates then within the context of
virtue ethics. The forgiving person does not seek revenge and will likely regard estrangement
and antagonism as unnatural and undesirable. Forgiveness in this way is attuned with morality,
integrity, a sense of justice, and self-respect, and to possess the virtue, a person needs skills of
self-awareness and self-management.39
Roberts’ view represents the popular perception of forgiveness as not only a positive,
constructive trait, but also as a virtue. There are virtue-laden traits and virtue-neutral ones, and
the distinction between the two seems to have more to do with character and morality, and less to
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do with plain ability or proficiency. For instance, we would not say that the ability to parallelpark a car is a virtue. It takes skill, but conceivably every person who can drive could learn to
parallel park. We cannot say that the capacity to parallel-park a car is virtuous because everyone
could learn if they took the time to do so. Labeling something as a virtue tends to conflate the
notions of morality and virtuosity with the notions of inherency and disposition. Margaret
Holmgren describes this as the relationship between attitudes and character traits: “attitudes
become ingrained and internalized such that they form a regular response to a recurring situation
and from this we can best understand character traits.”40 Virtues are types of traits that have
moral weight.
The way Roberts has imagined it, forgiveness cannot simply be learned, and it cannot be
separated from one’s character—either one espouses good morals, has integrity, and respects
justice, or one does not. Similarly, honesty is widely considered to be a virtue, and we consider
some people “honest” and others “liars” and these features mark their character. But we tend not
to say someone is a bad person if he or she cannot parallel park. Roberts has taken forgiveness
from the category of traits that includes parallel parking to the category of traits associated with
honesty and integrity. The ability to forgive is now categorized as a virtue—and therefore
charged with all that we associate with virtuosity.
The social and psychological defenses of forgiveness typically assume one of the
following positions: (a) that forgiveness is necessary for a society to progress and move forward,
or (b) that forgiveness is therapeutic and thus desirable for both the victim and the aggressor. I
will look at each of these cases for forgiveness in order to demonstrate how forgivingness has
come to be accepted as a virtue.
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Forgiveness has been associated with maintaining social order and fostering healthy
relationships to others.41 Because one’s own humanity is ultimately and inherently tied to
another, and because people consistently commit wrongs against others and are themselves the
victims of wrongdoing, forgiveness is seen as the means by which estranged persons or
communities are re-united, peace is restored, and the basic way in which humanity resists its own
self-destruction. Archbishop Desmond Tuto has gone so far as to argue that without forgiveness,
there will be no future—forgiveness is absolutely necessary.42 This is what Hannah Arendt
meant when she described forgiveness as the only possible means of breaking the cycle of
trespassing. According to Arendt, trespassing, or injury, is an unavoidable occurrence. The
“mutual release,” as she calls it, from the bonds of what we have done is the only way that “men
remain free agents, only by constant willingness to change their minds and start again.”43 Thus,
idea of willingness arises, and the significance of our willingness, at least for Tutu and Arendt, is
that it is critical for our future. Thus, those who are willing to lead us in forgiveness are
considered the exemplars of virtuosity, perhaps because they have been able to carry out
utilitarian ideals. We stand in awe of people like Nelson Mandela who forgive when they may
not even know the perpetrator’s name, who forgive those who have wronged them in atrocious
ways, and their forgivingness seems saint-like.44 Tuto has written of Nelson Mandela, “his
forgiveness still leaves the world gasping at the sheer wonder of it…the magnanimity.”45
For some, forgiveness offers a way to break free of the captivity of the past. As
mentioned above, the metaphysical fact that the past is irreversible makes it impossible to wipe
the slate completely clean, tabula rasa. If forgiveness is not forgetfulness, and we cannot ever
41
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forget past transgressions, people like Tutu have claimed that to forgive will result in freedom
from the burden of the unalterable past. Without forgiveness, they argue, there is no “progress,
no linear history, only a return to conflict and cycles of conflict.”46
The emphases on growth, moving forward, and letting go underlie the majority of nontheological perspectives on the benefits of forgiveness. According to Paul Coleman, “forgiveness
is more than a moral imperative…it is the only means, given our humanness and imperfections,
to overcome hate and condemnation and proceed with the business of growing and loving.”47
This brings us back to Paco and his father and the notion that our very humanness and
imperfections necessitate forgiveness because it might be the only way we can restore
relationships. We cannot reverse the past; we know that time only moves forward. But more
importantly, our “humanness,” as Coleman calls it, makes us culpable. Volf uses the metaphor of
a shark to explain this nicely: if a shark sees a surfer and mistakes her for a seal and takes a bite
and destroys her leg, there is nothing (no one) for the surfer to forgive; the shark did what it
naturally does, and it cannot be blamed for its action. According to Volf, the shark in this story
has injured the surfer, but has not wronged her.48 So what does it mean to wrong and how does
this relate to our humanness? Put simply, we are not sharks. We can be faulted for our
wrongdoings and negligence—the deliberate acts that are imputable to us—this is a fact of our
humanness.
Coleman’s view represents the summation of what Arendt and Tutu are claiming. That is,
forgiveness is not only morally commendable (and in Coleman’s eyes, required), but also there
are practical forces at play. Because we all have the ability to forgive—we have cognition and
rationality as moral agents—we need to be willing to forgive in order to maintain social order
46

Helmick, introduction, xxvii.
Helmick and Peterson, Forgiveness and Reconciliation, 387.
48
Volf, Free of Charge, 129.
47

22
and carry on with life. And because no person is perfect and we are burdened by our
wrongdoings as they stick to us (unlike the shark), then we, along with the eight hundred Pacos,
desire forgiveness in order for that burden to be lifted. Without forgiveness, so the argument
goes, we will stall progress and threaten the stability of community. Recall the utilitarian
argument that what is virtuous is what brings the greatest good to the greatest number, and we
see how the notion of willingness is important. In order for society to flourish, we must give
priority to the good that will come to the social order.
Forgiveness is also given serious consideration in terms of its therapeutic benefits. It is
viewed as a goal in psychotherapy, marital counseling, and group interventions.49 The notion of
“letting go” has been of interest to psychologists, who take forgiveness to be a means of healing.
Letting go implies that the victim’s life is no longer dominated by thoughts, memories, and
negative feelings, and this escape from the negative emotions that linger after the injury is central
to the weight placed on forgiveness by psychological research.50 Popularly, we might also
observe that forgiveness is the focus of numerous self-help books, and the internet is rife with
websites that collect quotes about forgiveness. In fact, among the top Google searches associated
with the term “forgiveness,” are “forgiveness verses,” “quotes about forgiveness,” “quotes
forgiveness,” “forgiveness lyrics,” and “forgiveness is.”51 Interestingly, forgiveness queries via
Google reached their highest number over the past decade in February 2014. All of this is to say
that questions about how to forgive, what influential people have said about forgiveness, and
Biblical references to forgiveness are at the forefront of people’s minds. I have no doubt that its
popular status as an unconditional good is related to its integration into therapeutic discourse.
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Further, the “closure” assumed to come with forgiveness is attractive to many people.52
Resentment is assumed to be an immense emotional burden that traps the victim in the moment
of injury. The release of negativity that is the primary aim of forgiveness (understood as the
overcoming of resentment) is clearly a strong motivation for those “trapped” we might say, by
resentment. In fact, Everett Worthington, a psychologist who has dedicated much of his research
to forgiveness, argues that the potential benefits of forgiveness are the most frequently and
extensively documented aspect of the topic.53 Offering forgiveness is acclaimed as a result of its
potential benefits, which seem to outweigh the emotional costs of withholding it. This is a classic
utilitarian justification for a virtue—forgiveness is virtuous because the emotional benefits will
bring us pleasure.

Forgiveness and Christianity
Forgiveness has been encouraged for centuries by many world religions for its spiritual
benefits and transformative power. Yet the theoretical models of forgiveness are relatively
new—thus it seems critical to understand religious perspectives on forgiveness, as they are older
than any sociological, psychological, or philosophical conceptualizations. Up until the mid1980s, most people associated forgiveness with religion—even non-religious people thought this
way, as common culture has appropriated the term “forgiveness” from its religious context.54
Several studies have found that religious strategies for forgiveness are most commonly cited, and
that people who are more religious value forgiveness more than those who are less religious.55
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There seems to be a clear link between forgiveness and major world religions, but most of the
existing research explores the central relationship between Christianity and forgiveness, so I will
devote my analysis of religion and forgiveness to the Christian tradition and its teachings.
Religious principles have included forgiveness in a number of ways. For one, forgiveness
can be imbued with divine qualities, so that in theistic religions, to forgive is to imitate God,
carry out God’s plan, or become closer to God.56 Christian parables provide figures that embody
forgivingness (most notably, Jesus Christ), and provide the support of those who champion a
worldview conducive to forgiveness, for injured parties processing an offense against them.
Another reason for focusing on Christianity is that it espouses a dominant (at least in
American culture) set of principles that inform forgiveness. Daniel Escher has argued that there
is a “socialization” by way of religious leaders, teachers, and community members, which
facilitates the internalization of religious beliefs. These schemas of socialization “include a
religious adherent’s internalization of certain moral directives about the necessity of
forgiveness…reinforced in various religious rituals…or prayers.”57 As the dominant religious
tradition in the West over the last two millennia, it seems important to understand the way the
internalization of Christian beliefs has influenced popular perceptions of forgiveness.
In the introduction, I briefly explained that repentance and forgiveness are fundamentally
tied to Christian doctrine because of humanity’s inherent sinfulness as a result of the fall of
mankind in the Book of Genesis, and I would like to now revisit this claim. The doctrine of
original sin is an attempt to extend the history of sin from its beginning to modern humankind, a
kind of “inherited corruption.”58 Original sin has yet to gain traction in religious studies
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scholarship on forgiveness, but I want to suggest that this doctrine plays an important role in the
centrality of Christian and biblical concerns for forgiveness.
The Judeo-Christian conception of sin is that while evil is not from God, God must be
responsible in some way because nothing can be beyond God—this is the classic problem of
theodicy. This tradition rejects the Gnostic suggestion of two Gods, and thus everything comes
from one God, and nothing can be from another. Because the Christian understanding of God
does not hold Him to be directly responsible for evil, we tend think of evil and sin as part of the
received condition of humanity, inherited in the biblical fall from grace of Adam and Eve; we are
at once guilty perpetrators and involuntary heirs of evil. What we are left with is a notion of sin
and transgression as inexplicable, common, and unrelenting experiences, and with this, a
syndrome of guilt This has been the foundation for Christian themes of repentance and reliance
on God for salvation.
One way of relating original sin to the greater discussion of forgiveness is that the fall of
humankind has made humans dependent on God’s forgiveness and salvation. Adam’s
disobedience demonstrates that humans are free to sin, so one implication may be that freedom
leads to sinfulness. So we see a shift in conceiving freedom as just part of the human condition to
viewing freedom as problematic to it. There is an increasing awareness of humanity’s corruption,
and a reinforced notion of salvation as entirely dependent on God’s grace. Humanity views itself
as Adam’s heirs, constantly being pulled down by the doomed heritage that Adam’s sin
bequeathed to us—a situation from which only Christ can redeem us.59
In an influential article on the topic, Hermann Häring has argued that original sin has
been read less as an analogue to the present experience and challenge of evil, and more as the
essential demise of human freedom. He explains, “the time of pernicious human freedom has
59
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now run its course and the time of an obedience bringing salvation has begun…in this way the
‘Christian’ story of the fall took on its specific contours.”60 Not only does the notion of inherent
sin convey obedience (and demand repentance) but it also sets Christianity up to claim to have
the solution to human guilt in ways that other traditions do not. The hopelessness of a constant
sense of personal guilt (because no one is infallible) finally has a historical explanation, and at
the same time, a response to it. The solution to the inevitable experience of sin has been
“institutionalized and monopolized” by Christianity in this way.61
Christ’s grace led to salvation and redemption, and while humanity is certainly culpable
for its sins in some ways—legally, morally, emotionally—it seems as if wrongdoings are
assumed to be givens, and importantly, so is forgiveness. It in part, places the origin of sin
historically, making it a prominent factor for the human condition yet one that remains out of our
hands. In other words: sin will happen, people will hurt one another, but Christianity has figured
out a solution for that history, which is having faith in Christ, the savior. As opposed to the
history of sin enduring, Christianity at once holds humanity responsible (and mandates
repentance) and promises forgiveness (through faith); God offers forgiveness in exchange for
repentance. Thus it has been argued that transgression and forgiveness are linked by the disorder
and imbalance that result from sin—humanity cannot tolerate the chaos of sin, so forgiveness is
implemented as a way to restore balance and order.62
According to the Christian scholar James G. Williams in a study conducted by Kenneth
Pargament and Mark Rye on the how religion influences the psychological processes of
forgiveness, the act of forgiveness is often understood as
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An act of pardon or release from an injury, offense, or debt. On the part of the forgiving
subject, it entails having compassion, releasing someone from any act or attitude that
would impede the relationship of those involved. On the part of the forgiving subject, it
usually entails showing signs of repentance for the wrong done and acts of contrition and
love, in keeping with the graciousness shown by the forgiver.63
This definition does not seem very much different than some philosophical
conceptualizations of forgiveness, except for two words: love and graciousness. These two words
are what distinguish Christian understandings of forgiveness from psychological or philosophical
or sociological understandings, because both “love” and “grace” are intimately tied to the
Christian construction of God. The Christian God of love, who became human in the person of
Jesus,64 enables the spirit and power of forgiveness in human beings through Jesus as the
messiah.65 The Bible is rife with parables and lessons of forgiveness and serves as an important
reference for Christians on the matter. From the cross, Jesus pleads for God’s mercy for his
crucifiers in the ultimate Christian example of forgiveness: “Father, forgive them, for they do not
know what they are doing.”66 Other references include the Lord’s Prayer—“forgive us our
trespasses as we forgive them that trespass against us”—and in Matthew—“Then Peter came to
Jesus and asked: ‘how many times shall I forgive my brother or sister who sins against me? Up
to seven times?’ and Jesus answered, ‘I tell you, not seven times, but seventy-seven times.’”67
And the Paco story calls to mind the parable of the Prodigal Son in Luke, when “His father saw
him and had compassion.”68
Each of these passages refers the reader to the ideas of grace and love in order to inspire
a forgiving spirit in those who strive to lead a Christ-like life. According to Williams, forgiving
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is at the heart of Christianity, for it “represents the possibility and reality of change and
transformation of the individual in relation to others and others in relation to the individual.”69
The notion that God is omni-benevolent, loves every person, and has allowed Christ to be
the ultimate figure of graciousness and forgivingness seems to give Christians a firmly rooted
worldview through which they can approach questions of forgiveness. While the morality of
forgiveness certainly is not diminished in Christian theology, it is supplanted by a doctrine of
unconditional love and grace as one strives to emulate Christ, imitatio Christi.
The idea that we are created in the image of God has inspired Archbishop Tutu’s
advocacy of forgiveness. He has expressed a long tradition of Christian thought when he argued,
“Monstrous deeds do not turn the perpetrators into monsters. A human person does not
ultimately lose his or her humanity which is characterized by the divine image in which every
individual is created.”70 The common Christian phrase, “Love the sinner, hate the sin”71 echoes
in Tutu’s claim. The theological framework for Tutu’s argument is clear: because we are created
in God’s image, all human beings have the capacity for transformation and reconciliation—no
person is reducible to his or her wrongdoings, and thus no person is beyond forgiveness. It is
important to note that God does not just spare sinners the consequences of sin. Rather, the sin is
separated from the sinner, and this is made possible by Christ’s unity with God and with
humanity. Because Christ dies for humanity’s sins and is one with God and humanity, God can
separate sinners from their sins.72
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Another way in which Christianity influences the discourse of forgiveness addresses the
problem posed by Coleman and Arendt, that our imperfections and weaknesses as human beings
predispose us to an unavoidable cycle of wrongdoing. Recognizing each person’s own fallibility
and inherent sinfulness, Christians are urged to forgive those who have injured them, because
they will all need God’s forgiveness. Thus Christian rhetoric emphasizes humility and empathy:
“we are going to need forgiveness, we are going to ask for it ourselves, and by these requests we
are in effect recognizing that forgiveness is something good. Because we will seek God’s
forgiveness we should be willing to grant forgiveness to those who seek it from us…[this is] a
matter of felt, generalized, unconditional love.”73 The implication of this teaching is that
Christians should forgive unilaterally. As a result, to resist forgiveness and be resentful is unChristian, and if one refuses to forgive others, he or she cannot expect forgiveness from God.
The Christian rhetoric of forgiveness then seems to operate from within the framework of
Divine Command theory as I have argued at the outset. As a Christian virtue, forgiveness can be
justified by Christian conceptions. According to Robert Downie, the Christian justification is:
“‘Since your Heavenly Father has forgiven you, you ought also to forgive others'. In other words,
forgiveness is justified as being a response to injury fitting in creatures who are themselves liable
to error.”74
This ethical context is also related to justice. The fifth petition in the Lord’s prayer—
“forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us”—illuminates something
about why forgiveness is a Christian virtue related to justice. The relationship between God’s
forgiveness and our forgiveness of others is related to Divine Command theory in the following
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way: because God forgives the sins of humanity, and forgiveness is commanded by God75, then
forgiveness counts as a virtue. The relationship is described nicely by William Mattison as “that
our forgiveness of our neighbors, or lack thereof, suggests a standard or rule that we think
represents the order of justice…and as Christ himself reminds us, ‘the measure with which you
measure will in return be measured out to you.’”76
One criticism employed by Trudy Govier in her discussion of religious traditions and
forgiveness is that to ground an ethic and conceptualization of forgiveness on theological footing
is difficult. She claims, “Although religious teachings offer rich resources for reflection, their
variety and uncertainty mean that they cannot eliminate the need for secular reasoning,
judgment, and reflection about the topic.”77 What she is arguing here is that theological doctrines
and parables cannot provide adequate guidance in practical, human affairs—not least because of
the variety of possible theories from different religious traditions. There are a few unanswered
(and perhaps unanswerable) questions within the Christian tradition that I wish to explore
further.
The notion of God’s forgiveness again arises in thinking about the expulsion or
persistence of guilt after one has been forgiven. Even after we forgive, is guilt removed, or just
anger? One could argue that someone is still guilty before the wronged person and/or God
because thinking about forgiveness through a theological lens does not (and perhaps cannot)
address the practical problem of guilt and blame. In other words, it is not clear that to forgive is
necessarily to remove blame—at least not in the definition Butler and subsequent theorists in this
paper have used. If to forgive, as Butler claimed, is to forgo revenge and resentment, then that
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does not seem to necessarily remove guilt. This could have several implications from within the
Christian perspective.
We can imagine that an offender commits a wrong, and is punished, but the injured
person is a devout Christian and, in the spirit of God-like forgiveness, forgives the offender. Yet,
the offender remains guilty in the eyes of the law and perhaps the community and on official
record, so the fact that he or she has been forgiven does not remove that type of guilt. And we
can also imagine the inverse: a devout Christian offender is not punished by the law and faces no
societal consequences like fines, imprisonment, or even public shame. The injured party (not a
Christian, for the sake of argument) does not believe forgiveness is mandatory or appropriate and
withholds forgiveness. In this case, the offender is not legally or socially guilty—he or she has
not been punished—but does he or she remain guilty before God and in the eyes of the offender?
Volf would argue that, indeed, the situation is complicated—for Christians, forgiving often takes
place in a triangle of the offender, the wronged person, and God. “Take God away,” Volf argues,
“and the foundations of forgiveness become unsteady and may even crumble.”78 Again, we are
reminded of Divine Command Theory—the virtuosity of forgiveness is largely dependent on the
fact that it is commanded by God. It has been argued that Jesus Christ, as God incarnate, “is far
more than a great moral teacher. He was that, and his injunctions on forgiveness…are powerfully
true rules for us in how to live our own lives.”79
To be truly forgiven, sins are not just disregarded by God, but completely removed—the
sin is separated from the sinner as Christian rhetoric has allowed for. Volf returns to this idea
later when he writes, “As long as offenses stick to those who have committed them, the offenders
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remain offenders, even if they are viewed as if they were not.”80 This notion is problematic if we
keep in mind that humans are not sharks—we are accountable for our wrongs and remain guilty.
Is blotting out the sin from the sinner turning humans into sharks?

What forgiveness is not
If we can concede that unconditional forgiveness (and forgivingness as the propensity to
forgive) is popularly held to be a virtue—that is, something to which we attribute moral worth
and regard as being tied to one’s character, we have only done part of the work in defining
forgiveness.81 Forgiveness is a way of addressing problems caused by the wrongdoings of others
and moving forward, but there are similar attitudes with which it might be confused. It should
not be conflated with condoning or forgetting the wrongdoing. When I will suggest later that
forgiveness is not virtuous in some particular cases, it will not be because I have equated
forgiveness with condonation or forgetting. I agree with the proponents of forgiveness who
would say that there is a critical distinction between forgiving an injury and justifying an injury.
The very act of forgiving requires recognition of the act as wrong. Further, my argument against
unconditional forgiveness is not based on a belief that to forgive is always to condone.
My argument is against the idea that simply because one recognizes an injury as wrong,
that in turn, forgiveness is unconditionally necessary or virtuous. On the contrary, it is not only
unnecessary, but in some cases, dissolute and immoral. Yet in either case, the difference in the
characteristics of what it means to forgive as opposed to what it means to forget or condone is
worth explicating.
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What are the differences between forgiveness and related notions? Pardoning,
overlooking, condoning, and absolving all look like forgiveness in some ways, but there is
something distinct about forgiveness that makes it resistant to being integrated with these
associated concepts. Condoning is to agree to overlook a wrong that has been done, not to deny it
(as in the case of excusing).82 Pardoning is similar in that it does not require the offender to
admit any wrong. Pardoning, moreover, implies that the retribution or punishment is taken away,
not the accusation itself. Berel Lang has argued that absolution is most frequently associated
with religious forgiving, because it implies a literal and metaphysical ‘erasure’ of the past—
God’s absolution of humanity’s sins is unconditional.83 Absolution, then, has qualities of
ultimate removal of sins, which cannot always be reconciled with interpersonal transgressions
beyond the realm of Christian theology.
Certain instances of forgiveness may resemble condoning, particularly when the person
being forgiven cannot or does not articulate what his or her transgression was. Just because the
wronged person and the offender recognize and understand the injury between them does not
mean forgiveness should necessarily follow. As Trudy Govier points out in her book Forgiveness
and Revenge, “we can understand acts without fully [forgiving] them.”84 The danger, I think, is
when we forgive acts without fully understanding them. The danger of pardoning, condoning,
absolving, and excusing evils committed against us comes when forgiveness is approached as a
necessary or compulsory act—not as a conditional one.
The familiar phrase “forgive and forget” may mislead us into thinking that forgivingness
and forgetfulness somehow go hand-in-hand. Popular conceptions of forgiveness understand it as
a means to freedom from the pressure of resentment on memory. Celebrity psychologist Dr. Phil
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explains, forgiveness is “releasing yourself from anger, hatred and resentment…I’m not saying it
is easy, only that it is necessary.”85 The person offering forgiveness does so in an attempt to free
his or her mind from the negative emotions of the offense. One might argue that upon
forgiveness, all is forgotten and thus overlooked, and the effects of condemnation are lifted from
the offender as well—he or she no longer is burdened by the wrong. More importantly, the
burdens of condemnation and the associated hurt, embarrassment, and indignation are lifted from
the mind of the forgiver. On the contrary, even advocates of forgiveness have argued that
forgiveness need not erase or disregard the wrong, at least in the offenses that go beyond
ordinary transgressions.86 Condemnation is intertwined with forgiveness; condemnation is not
forgotten when forgiveness is offered—rather, it is inseparable from the process. As Volf
explains, “we accuse when we forgive,” and as I have argued above, the accusation does not
disappear—that would be condonation, which forgiveness is not. In short, because condemnation
runs inseparably through the act of forgiveness, the wrong need not (and perhaps cannot) be
forgotten.
Murphy raises an interesting point about the problematic nature of forgiving and
forgetting—he argues that there is a lack of agency involved in the case of forgetting.87
Forgetting—at least in the most literal sense—is non-voluntary. If Murphy is correct that there is
no agency, be it moral or not, in forgetting, then to conflate forgetting with forgiving would not
work. Forgiveness is a choice, but forgetfulness is not.
This is not to say that because forgiveness is not forgetting or condoning that it is
unconditionally virtuous and morally acceptable. It is to demonstrate that because we may only
forgive what was initially appropriate to resent then resentment and forgiveness can only co85
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operate when the transgression remains integral.88 But, I will argue, even with the above
understanding in mind, there are instances in which forgiveness is not appropriate.

Unconditional forgiveness
The type of forgiveness that I will argue is not and cannot be a virtue is that which
diminishes our morality or the moral community. Forgiveness eo ipso might not yield this kind
of result; only when it is unconditioned and unilaterally held to be a virtue is there a danger that
it will compromise moral principles because there are no limits to its appropriateness.
Unconditional forgiveness is understood here in the sense that it lacks limitations and
stipulations about when it is the right moral choice. Very few virtues or traits can be understood
categorically, or unconditionally; it is difficult to say anything is a “good” across all possible
situations. Kant’s categorical imperative—that one could will his or her own maxims to be
universalized—could be considered at this point. In order for unconditional forgiveness to be a
virtue (under virtue ethics) it would be that which will always benefit the person who possesses
forgivingness. I will argue this cannot be the case with unconditional forgiveness because in
some cases, the forgiving attitude is morally wrong and not beneficial to the victim (or the moral
community), and thus one should not will it to be a universal quality.
My argument against unconditional forgiveness is that despite the forgiving attitude’s
virtuous reputation, it cannot count as a virtue if it is morally problematic. There are times when
it is appropriate to forgive, and times when it is appropriate to withhold forgiveness, and I cannot
account for all possible situations where the decision between resentment and forgiveness is
relevant, these will vary immensely. Given its nature as a deeply emotional and personal process,
scenarios involving forgiveness and resentment will be nuanced. Nevertheless, I want to argue
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that in any case, it is not moral to forgive if in the process we negate our own moral rights, or
deny the moral rights of others. If forgiveness is unconditional and unquestioning—if it requires
no consideration of principles of morality—then it cannot be said to be a virtue. What is in
question for my evaluation is whether or not unconditional forgiveness is a virtue. In turn, I will
show that it is conditional forgiveness which is commendable; only in its conditioned form could
it be considered beneficial trait of the beholder.

Conditional Forgiveness
Fixed in my understanding of forgiveness is the notion that giving forgiveness is at the
discretion of the person who has been wronged (or those affected by the injury), and its
suitability is conditioned by the principles of morality: this is conditional forgiveness. When
forgiveness can be aligned with self-respect, and respect of others and the integrity of the moral
community, forgiveness is indeed a virtue. But the virtuosity of forgiveness is dependent on the
conditions having been met. This is why unconditional forgiveness—which may or may not meet
these conditions—cannot always ensure that forgiveness is a moral choice; forgivingness cannot
be universally adopted as a positive, virtuous attribute. Because forgiveness always is put side by
side with resentment—one can either adopt one attitude or the other—when the conditions for
forgiveness cannot be met, then embracing resentment, rather than overcoming it, is a more
virtuous response. It should now be clear that I am not suggesting that forgiveness should never
be issued, or that it is never virtue. Rather, my position is that a more morally responsible
approach to the subject would be to condition forgiveness upon certain principles, so that we can
say only when these principles are met that forgiveness is moral or virtuous, and when they are
not, the attitude is not a virtue.

37
Because I want to show the way in which forgiveness is held as a virtue, and resentment
as a non-virtue, and eventually argue that in some cases, these connotations may be reversed, it
will be useful to start by understanding forgiveness and resentment in terms of their attitudes,
their attributes, potential advantages and disadvantages, and accompanying perspectives.

Resentment: Social and Psychological Understandings
According to Butler, “resentment towards any man hath plainly a tendency to beget the
same passion in him who is the object of it; and this again increases it in the other,” and so goes
the vicious cycle that Arendt was so weary of.89 It is in this manner that resentment is often
viewed—an emotion that creates further problems rather than resolving the one in question.
Resentment may be viewed as a sort of moral anger, the type of anger that is calculated and
intentional rather than the result of a knee-jerk reaction. Butler characterized resentment as
involving one’s cognitive faculties, more than just sensation, but “the effect of reason.”90
Resentment often functions on two levels. We resent the actions taken against us: this
was morally wrong and should not have happened. We also resent the fact that it happened to us
in particular: life is not fair. In either case, resentment is deeply tied to morality. It stands as a
“testimony to the moral order,” according to Murphy, and invokes the concept of knowing right
from wrong.91 A resentful person is therefore bitter both about his or her fate and misfortune and
toward the offender. Resentment may become engrained in one’s attitude about the nature of the
world. Ongoing resentment may “support a sense of rage and envy, an embittered sense that
fundamentally one has been unjustly selected to be a victim, a generalized unhappiness with the
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world, and an inability to move ahead in life.”92 For this reason, some psychologists have
suggested that resentment is correlated with decreased satisfaction in life. Depression and
anxiety have been listed among what we might call the “side effects” of bitterness.93 These
claims about forgiveness reflect a utilitarian perspective: the process of forgiveness and its
positive associations with happiness count toward forgiveness as a virtue because it brings
pleasure to both the forgiver and the offender. Worthington claims, “It seems obvious that people
who are unforgiving experience more anger and depression.”94
A resentful attitude has also been associated with weakness, as Jean Hampton has argued.
She suggests that resentment reflects insecurities: it is “an emotional defense against attacks on
self-esteem,” but we only resent those who have the power to humiliate us.95 William Young
expressed a similar point: resentment acknowledges that one feels that his or her worth depends
on “how one is seen by others, a confession that one’s status can be successfully challenged by
how one is perceived.”96 In other words, allowing oneself to become resentful implicitly affirms
whatever the insult was. If it were not true, why not just laugh it off? Of course, one has to
wonder how a theory like resentment is weakness would stand up in cases of great and pervasive
evil, and later I will argue that a defense of forgiveness (and implicitly a rejection of resentment)
on these grounds will fail.
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Resentment and Christianity
Christian doctrine regarding resentment appears to be less focused on the origins and
consequences of resentful anger and more concerned with where the anger is directed.97 I will
show that while the Christian tradition broadly rejects resentment and prizes forgiveness, it may
be more sympathetic to anger than popular or psychological understandings of resentment.
“Righteous anger,” as it is sometimes called,98 is suggested in Paul’s letter to the Ephesians:
Be angry, and don’t sin. Don’t let the sun go down on your wrath….Let him who stole
steal no more; but rather let him labor, working with his hands the thing that is good, that
he may have something to give to him who has need…. Let all bitterness, wrath, anger,
outcry, and slander, be put away from you, with all malice. And be kind to one another,
tenderhearted, forgiving each other, just as God also in Christ forgave you.99
Paul’s commands here acknowledge the inevitably of anger and perhaps even a suggestion that
one should be angry about certain things. This righteous anger can have transformative power if
directed in a God-like way, and we are charged to channel our anger into the service of God
rather than as a ground for perpetuating sin.100 It seems, then, that anger can be justified if it is
used for the improvement of society. Why then do hatred and resentment necessarily need to be
overcome by forgiveness? Why is resentment not a theological virtue?
The Christian answer to this is two-fold. First, we have a view that mirrors Butler’s
understanding of excessive resentment and its dangers. Further, there is a more doctrinally
located conception of God’s wrath and ultimate judgment that eliminates the compulsion (and
suitability) of humans to harbor resentment.
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L. Gregory Jones makes an argument against resentment that resonates with Butler’s fear
of excess. Recall that Butler feared gratuitous anger and hatred in the wake of injury—the
superfluous tendency of resentment is what makes it problematic. For Jones, it is the frequency,
not the amount, of resentment which is troubling. We do not need excuses, Jones argues, to hate
or desire retribution; these urges are deeply sown within us. The effects of persistent anger can
be debilitating, and Christians should look to the example of Christ, who does not return hate to
his betrayers but instead reconciles with them.101
Resentment must also be examined in light of the Christian doctrine of salvation and
God’s justice:
Leave room for God’s wrath, for it is written, ‘Vengeance is mine; I will repay’ the lord
says…Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good.102
What does this tell us about the juxtaposition of human judgment to God’s judgment? The
possibility of eternal justice takes the power to be wrathful out of human hands. The final justice
meted out to our aggressors is in God’s hands, and the Christian injunction to love our enemies
precludes us from using God’s eventual punishment of the offender as a justification for hatred
in this life.103 There is a call to seek salvation of all persons, even those who have injured us—
this is our only task, and the fate of our enemies is not up to human reason. The command to
“hope that all will be saved, and to pray and love others accordingly,” suggests that even if God
will punish our wrongdoers, it would be wrong for us to validate hatred, “moral or otherwise, as
normatively good response to sin or wrongdoing.”104 Despite these clear warnings against
vengeance, I will suggest that perhaps there is room in Biblical teachings for the kind of
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resentment that I believe is morally responsible, and that the Christian understanding of
“righteous anger” might be more compatible with resentment than it has been treated.

Defenses of Resentment
According to many thinkers like Young and Hampton, and even popularly, resentment is
not regarded as enjoyable or constructive. I think even a defender of the resentful attitude could
agree that resentment prima facie is not a pleasant experience—as an attitude it is surely not
something many would choose, given other more pleasant attitudes to choose from. The other
side of the coin, however, is that no one chooses to be wronged. I will now present some
arguments by which we may see that in some cases resentment may be warranted.
Robert Solomon presents one such theory. Solomon has defended resentment by his
understanding of it as a response to injury against the self. He has held the opposite view of those
who understand resentment as weakness. In fact, Solomon regards resentment as “deeply
philosophical;” it allows the resentful person to extract from his or her particular circumstances
something about the wrongs of society in general, and in turn he or she will question those
powers and institutions who have allowed such injustices to occur. Resentment is “the passion of
justice denied,” used to “put the world in balance.”105
Resentment as a passion has been a sticking point for those concerned with the tensions
around it. Jeffrie Murphy defends resentment by a direct refutation of what Butler has to say
about the passions. Before we explore Murphy’s argument, we should revisit Butler’s
understanding of resentment. According to his sermons, forgiveness is the foreswearing of
resentment, but it should be noted that forgiveness is not forgetfulness. That is, for Butler,
forgiveness is a choice to not seek revenge and is thus a morally commanded, God-pleasing
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virtue. Forgetting is not a choice—it just happens. Butler reasoned that forgiveness is the
virtuous choice, because resentment will result in undesirable consequences. Resentment, to
Butler, when it extends beyond the useful form of reinforcing moral norms and rules, “as human
weakness and vanity typically allow it to, it becomes counterproductive and even seriously
harmful to the social fabric.”106 These excesses of the passions of resentment are what Butler
thinks we will avoid by adopting a forgiving attitude.
Using Butler’s argument as a backdrop, Murphy argues that resent is a response to a
wrong against the self, and thus the chief value of resentment is preservation of self-respect. He
links the notion of personhood to resentment in an interesting way: following his argument that a
person who does not resent a moral wrong against oneself lacks self-respect, he claims
resentment is a “good thing, for it is essentially tied to a non-controversially good thing—selfrespect.”107 Indeed, using self-respect as a lens through which the virtues and vices are viewed
changes the picture. A person who is quick to forgive might lack self-respect. Having Strawson’s
“reactive attitude” is indicative of a person’s cognizance of his or her own rights and worth. The
consequences of disregarding self-respect in the name of making amends could have dire
consequences—perhaps worse than Butler’s excess of passions. Murphy explains this well:
Forgiveness may indeed restore relationships, but to seek restoration at all cost— even at
the cost of one’s human dignity—can hardly be a virtue. And, in intimate relationships, it
can hardly be true love or friendship either—the kind of love and friendship that Aristotle
claimed is an essential part of the virtuous life. When we are willing to be doormats for
others, we have, not love, but rather…‘morbid dependency.’108
I will ultimately follow Murphy in my understanding of resentment, in that it is justified
when self-respect, and a respect for the rules of morality, are at stake.
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Joram Graf Haber, in his book Forgiveness, also wrestles with the question of resentment
and devotes almost half of book to the ethics of resentment. In building a defense of resentment
as a virtuous concept, Haber believes we must first concede that resentment has a “bad
reputation,” one that is undeserved. According to Haber, it is not resentment that is intrinsically
immoral or wrong: it is “in excess, misplaced, or vindictive” circumstances.109 And, in order for
resentment to count as something virtuous, Haber aptly argues that it must have beneficial effects
on character. Echoing Murphy, Haber claims that an absence of resentment, when it is warranted,
demonstrates a lack of self-respect. And thus, because “it is better to be self-respectful than it is
to be servile, the possession of this quality is beneficial to its owner.”110 In other words, a
disposition to resent when it is warranted is virtuous because the person is affirming respect for
himself or herself.
It should be noted that Haber, Murphy, and eventually I defend resentment in cases when
it is morally warranted—not to be confused with the popular understanding of resentment or the
resentful personality. What typically comes to mind is the begrudging, stubborn person unwilling
to forgive unilaterally and disposed to resent under all circumstances. It is commonly held that
the resentful person will ultimately inflict self-harm, “like a scorpion stinging itself to death with
its own tail.”111 We might all agree that resentment, in that way as it is commonly perceived, is
not virtuous; but I will argue that when resentment is profoundly and truly necessitated by moral
injury, we should not be so quick to abandon it in favor of forgiveness.
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Unforgivable Evils
Given that I have provided a general picture of forgiveness and resentment, a question
arises: is it morally appropriate to forgive the perpetrator of a certain type of evil? This kind of
evil, which I will argue is unforgivable, is the kind that detracts from someone else’s
personhood, that which attempts to devalue someone’s humanity and regard them as lesser.
Jessica Wolfendale calls this kind of evil dehumanizing.112 Of course, not all evils and not all
transgressions are categorically dehumanizing—typically interpersonal forgiveness deals with
relatively minor injuries (or minor evils, even) that we would not consider to be dehumanizing.
To be sure, all acts of wrongdoing convey a certain message about the victim’s value as we saw
in my earlier discussion of moral injury; but according to Wolfendale, “acts of dehumanizing
evil communicate a particularly abhorrent version of this message.”113 These evils say something
about a person being inferior, usually because they are of a certain social, racial, ethnic, or
religious group. The victims may be targeted because they are women, Jews, homosexuals,
African Americans, etc. A complete abandon of respect is at play.
The issue of unforgivability arises with regard to instances of evil that prompt not only
insult or humiliation, but also outrage. The scale of these acts can be large—inflicted on entire
groups of people—a crime against humanity such as the atrocities of the Holocaust. But it may
also be as small as having affected one person—the torture of one person. Some injuries,
according to Griswold, “may be so profound that it seems humanly impossible…that resentment
should be sent away.”114
Others have thought about unforgivability in relation to the perpetrator. Cheyney Ryan
has argued that unforgivable evils destroy hope, to the extent that we no longer believe anything
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positive could happen; because children and infants represent hope and promise, evils where
young people are affected are especially offensive to us.115 In Ryan’s view, the crime is
inseparable from the person—a perpetrator of such hope-crushing evil is also hopeless. We
cannot believe this person is capable of good. Mark Goulden also draws a hardline of
unforgivability, he has claimed the nature of the crime marks the offending agent as
unforgivable. The human mind, he says, is incapable of “comprehending the magnitude and
mathematics” of cases such as sending children to Nazi gas chambers.116 For Gouldon, some acts
are just too evil to forgive the person who committed them.
Unforgiveable evils are directly related to moral injuries. There are moral injuries that are
insulting, and then there are those that are intentionally degrading. That is, in certain cases of
degrading, dehumanizing moral injury, the evil is unforgivable because to forgive would be an
indication that one lacks self-respect. Glen Pettigrove has argued that to forgive such a wrong
“communicates to the wrongdoer and to the community that one is not deserving of respect.” 117
The question of unforgivability is especially complicated when we ask who has the
power to forgive. Forgiveness unquestionably belongs to the injured (or so is the consensus of
the literature on forgiveness), but what about cases when the injured are dead and thus incapable
of doing so? Goulden attempts to answer this question by arguing that if the dead cannot forgive,
then neither can the living.118 The only appropriate response in that case would be lack of
forgiveness.
For Volf, the power to forgive is related to Christian theology—God has already forgiven
humanity, and thus we have the power to forgive others. But power and right are distinct, at least
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for Volf, and the issue of right is related to self-respect. Volf conceives of moral law as being
greater than one’s own set of self-governing rules. Rather, moral law is what binds us and ties
members of a community together.119 This is significant because if this is true, then the offender
has not wronged just one person, but the moral law is broken and thus the entire community is
affected. Nevertheless, power may be one of the greatest obstacles to forgiveness even if we
have the right:
It’s the worry that, even if we had as much goodness and inner strength as Jesus
did on the cross, and even if wrongdoers did their part eagerly, for us mere humans,
forgiveness might still be both impossible and inappropriate.120
Arguments against the unforgivable
Perhaps the greatest opposition to the notion that there are unforgivable evils is the notion
that the wrongdoer is an individual, separate from his or her wrongdoings. Govier has articulated
a clear objection to the basic notion of unforgivability:
“Grant that some acts are utterly inexcusable and profoundly wrong. Grant that
such acts are monstrous, brutal, gross, horrifying, and atrocious. Grant that such
acts should never be excused, justified, or condoned. Grant that we should forever
decry their immorality and that their heinous nature should be recorded in human
history never to be erased. Grant that victims should be honored in memory and
survivors respected...Whatever they have done, and however much we may be
tempted to refer to them as “monsters,” “madmen,” or “rotten,” the fundamental
fact remains: perpetrators are human beings and our fellow creatures. They are
persons with a capacity for moral reflection and transformation, and we should
treat them accordingly.”121
Govier’s argument reveals a popular criticism against unforgivability. Underlying her claim, of
course, is the popular adage: hate the sin, and love the sinner. It is true that even though a person
does not become his or her act—the agent is of course distinct from the action (metaphysically,
at least)—but there is a sense in which the act becomes irremovable from how we evaluate the
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perpetrator’s character. I will argue that a person’s moral capacity is diminished in accordance
with the execution of some atrocious evils; the act is intrinsically related to the wrongdoer.
Jean Hampton has also considered the relationship of a perpetrator to his or her act, and
argued that the call to love our enemies has definite religious undertones. Hampton, along with
Govier, holds that it is possible to retain hatred of an agent’s deeds and still feel compassion for
the individual. She imagines that Jesus, in his command to love our enemies, “is telling us that
such compassion is always possible.”122 In response, however, I would argue that while
compassion may be possible, that does not necessarily make it morally responsible or virtuous to
exercise it.
Hampton makes what appears to be a compelling argument that God the “father,”
demonstrates this kind of compassion for humanity, as any parent regards his or her child as
inherently good.123 It is precisely the parental belief in unconditional goodness that I object to
because this line of reasoning leads to unconditional forgiveness, which I will argue is not
always a virtuous choice. To believe that the agent is distinct from the act does not seem
inherently wrong, in fact it may even seem innately right, until we see that to separate the two
will allow for unconditional forgiveness.
Wolfendale has warned against “freezing” the perpetrators character in this way we are
reapplying the original dehumanizing attitude of the offender—the victim was reduced to his or
her gender, skin color, or religion and now the perpetrator is reduced to his or her act.124 I want
to argue, however, that there is a distinction between the first outlook of the perpetrator and the
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outlook of the unforgiving victim. In the first case the perpetrator does not have grounds for
believing and acting upon the notion that the victim is inherently inferior—race, gender, religion,
sexual identity—since these are (or should be) irrelevant to the assessment another person’s
worth. Conversely, the perpetrator has acted in a way that has diminished his or her own
character, and consequently there are grounds (based on the act) to judge this person accordingly.
Wolfendale and Govier would argue that to concede that the offender has the possibility
for change, the “capacity for moral reflection and transformation,” is what is important.
Wolfendale writes, “The object of the [unforgiving] attitude is dehumanized because they are
denied recognition of and respect for the essentially human capacity for rational moral
agency.”125 In other words, by not recognizing the perpetrator as a person with equal propensity
to change and become better, we risk becoming bound to the cycle of dehumanization.
This line of reasoning presents an opportunity to go into more depth about the kind hatred
associated with unforgivable evils, and the specific instances wherein I believe forgiveness is not
virtuous, based on my understanding of virtuosity as related to that which will be part of the
good life, and that which could be willed to be universally applied. Introducing these conditions
will address further the above objections to the notion of unforgivability, as I offer an account of
particular circumstances under which forgiveness and the moral hatred provoked by
dehumanizing evil, are incompatible.

When should we withhold forgiveness?
In its simplest form, my argument is that when forgiveness does not align with principles
of self-respect and respect for others, it should be withheld. This section will explore the times
when forgiveness is not virtuous in order to show that in some cases, resentment is just as
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virtuous if not more virtuous than forgiveness. Some evils obliterate the possibility for
forgiveness without disregarding self-respect or respect for others. These acts typically (though
not always) involve remote offenders or have rendered those whom they have directly affected as
incapable of offering forgiveness.
Forgiveness of dehumanizing acts of evil is that which is least compatible with selfrespect and respect for others. The kind of evil that reduces a person’s humanity produces what
Jean Hampton calls “moral hatred” in the wronged person. Moral hatred expresses aversion to
the (im)moral content of not just the immoral cause the action upholds, but also the person’s
character who committed the wrong, as this person is taken to be identified with the cause.126 In
other words, the offender is associated with the evil cause, and the hatred from the victim is
based on an inability to separate immoral cause from immoral person. To be clear, I do not see
this inability as a fault of the injured person; rather it demonstrates a justified resistance to
accepting the idea that a moral person could perpetrate a profoundly immoral wrong. The
offender, by association with the evil imbedded in his or her wrong, is believed “to have ‘rotted’
or ‘gone bad’ so that his or her goodness has in some increment diminished.”127
The type of hatred Hampton describes is directly related to the notion of dehumanizing
evil. It might be what one feels toward Adolf Hitler, or to a lesser but similar degree toward
Myra Hindley of the Moors Murders in England—someone whose “goodness” seems
irredeemably tarnished. Is it possible to believe these people have any decency remaining in
them? Can we separate agent from act as Wolfendale would have it? Of course, one might
believe that a person has some decency left—perhaps the person has apologized and displayed
remorse—but still one might not expect enough is left to make it possible to forgive. In a way,
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we are continually left facing Arendt’s metaphysical problem, that the past simply cannot be
undone. This sounds awfully bleak, so I wish to reiterate that this special kind of judgment and
moral hatred is reserved for particularly extreme and atrocious evils.
It is, of course, difficult to determine someone else’s moral capacity. The eminent
Christian injunction to “love thy enemy” suggests we should have faith in the inherent goodness
of humanity, though that is the kind of unconditional forgiveness that I question. Hampton,
otherwise a champion of forgiveness, in a moment of candidness it seems, has echoed my
concern with the kind of unconditional forgiveness put forth in Christian doctrine:
Perhaps God can find enough good in certain highly immoral individuals I have known
to forgive them and wash away their crimes, but I confess to finding it beyond me. This
confession may place me outside the proper sphere of Christian faith and charity; if so,
then [I] for moral reasons cannot sustain the charity this religion would require.
(Hampton 153).
Hampton’s confession will be useful in expounding what could possibly be a tension
between the Christian doctrine of forgiveness and the notion of unconditional forgiveness. Is it
possible to love our enemies in such a God-like gesture of grace? Even if God can maintain hope
in a person’s moral capacity after grave acts of evil (unconditionally), it may well be beyond our
own aptitude to maintain faith in every person’s decency. Interestingly, my view may have
support from within the tradition itself.
There seems to be ambiguity from within Christianity about the place of moral hatred. In
Matthew, Christ utters the eminent order to “love your enemy and pray for your persecutors”128
But what about the incident earlier in Matthew when Christ berates the scribes: “Woe unto you,”
he cries, “For ye are like unto white-washed sepulchers, which outwardly appear beautiful, but
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inwardly are full of dead men’s bones.”129 It is unclear what Jesus meant by this, but there could
be a relationship between being filled with “dead men’s bones,” and being morally dead.
Now that I have discussed moral hatred and its relationship to forgiveness, I will more
closely examine the three instances where I believe forgiveness must necessarily be withheld:
when it is incompatible with self-respect; when it is incompatible with respect for others; and,
finally, when the offender is either unapologetic or inaccessible.

1. Self-respect
Murphy is particularly concerned with the relationship of the forgiving attitude to selfrespect. “Proper self-respect,” according to Murphy, “is essentially tied to the passion of
resentment.”130 If proper self-respect is tied to resentment, it would seem that forgiveness would
never be compatible with self-respect. Yet to understand that claim in this way is too superficial
an understanding of his argument and would not serve to support my case. Murphy’s understands
self-respect to be paramount when one considers the two options available after injury:
resentment or forgiveness. Forgiveness, according to Murphy:
…heals and restores…what would be the consequences of never forgiving? Surely it
would be the impossibility of ever having the kind of intimate relationships that are one
of the crowning delights of human existence. The person who cannot forgive is the
person who cannot have friends or lovers…[but] not to have resentment when our rights
are violated is to convey—emotionally—either that we do not think we have rights or that
we do not take our rights very seriously. Forgiveness may indeed restore relationships,
but to seek restoration at all cost—even at the cost of one’s very human dignity—can
hardly be a virtue.131
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We can take Murphy’s emphasis on the relationship between self-respect and dealing with moral
injury as a means for understanding why forgiveness would be inappropriate if it abandons selfrespect.
Conditional forgiveness, as I have argued, is the kind of forgiveness which does not
compromise dignity in the process of restoring a relationship. Murphy has nicely summed up his
argument that resentment protects self-respect. But I wish to take this further and discuss why
self-respect and forgiveness of certain types of evil are incompatible, and why resentment is a
more virtuous response when one’s self-worth has been compromised.
Murphy conceives of moral injury to be a direct violation of one’s rights,132 and again,
Wolfendale imagines this to be “dehumanizing evil,” the injury which degrades one’s
personhood. Both types of injury involving self-respect transcend mere indignation or
embarrassment. The kind of evil to which I am referring is a severe affront to one’s self-worth,
and I one that I argue renders forgiveness morally inappropriate. A suitable example might be the
case of a female rape victim. This type of aggression goes beyond demeaning, and the offender
has made a statement, through his actions, about the victim’s worth. The offender has robbed the
victim of a fundamental part of her personhood, and this could lead her to internalize the injury
and feel herself degraded. In addition to any physical harm done, the offender has also
communicated something about his estimation of her worth, and this could have a significant
impact on the victim’s psyche.133
In the wake of the injury, the victim of rape will likely experience the kind of moral
hatred explained above. That is, the offender—in the victim’s eyes—has also lost something
about his personhood. His act is thoroughly tied to an immoral cause—that women, or others in
132
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general, are mere sexual objects, less valuable, and can be treated as such—and because the
offender and the immoral content of his offense are inseparable, forgiveness would be immoral.
Moreover, we might imagine the victim to be familiar with her aggressor—perhaps he is
a friend, relative, or even a lover. As Murphy has argued, popular perceptions of forgiveness
hold that it is the key to restoring relationships. But in cases like rape, we might ask: at what
cost? Can we say that the benefit of having this relationship restored and healed outweighs the
cost of accepting an injury that has attempted to diminish her personhood? It is also conceivable
that the offender was a stranger. But even still, without the complications of restoring a personal
relationship, forgiveness remains immoral. In this case, the attitude of resentment will
demonstrate one’s position that this treatment is wrong and perhaps facilitate the victim’s
process of reclaiming the dignity unjustly stripped from her.
In this way, we can see how unconditional forgiveness cannot capture the problematic
nature of forgiveness in a case where one’s self-worth has been diminished. Forgiveness,
unqualified, would hold the rapist to be worthy of forgiveness. But to attempt to separate the
deed from the wrongdoer would be to ignore the immorality of the offender, and I cannot see the
virtue in that. Unconditional forgiveness would say all persons are worthy of forgiveness—
forgiveness should be a universal maxim—but it cannot account for the instances where
forgiveness would not be beneficial for the person dispensing it. If it is not beneficial, according
to virtue ethics, it is not a virtue. Of course, if there is a way to forgive the offender without
compromising the victim’s self-worth, then forgiveness would be a virtuous attitude. However, I
do not see how this is possible, and therefore resentment must be the proper response. Only
resentment can defend self-respect.
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2. Respect for others
Another case in which forgiveness would be immoral is to turn the other cheek in a way
that will perpetuate and reaffirm the evil. I have argued that forgiveness is related to that which
could initially be resented, and I have questioned what this means for those who are indirectly
affected by the wrong. In this section I will argue that there are instances when forgiveness could
be offered (and thus withheld) by a person or group not directly affected, but affected insofar as
they have a desire for justice and punishment prevail.
I have in mind cases where the injury is in fact an injury to humanity—not just one
particular person or family, but rather—the kind of evil that shakes the foundation of the moral
community at large. The destruction of hope, as Cheyney saw it, causes suffering not only for the
direct victim(s), but also for secondary and indirect victims as well. Moreover, the kind of act I
regard as unforgiveable tends to be the kind of wide-spread or monumentally atrocious one that
affects an entire nation, race, generation, or even all of society. It is difficult in these situations to
“gain a sense of the wrongdoer as a person, hard to comprehend how anyone could do such
things…thus it is much harder to feel empathy with, or compassion for, the offender.”134
While it may be true that secondary and indirect victims—those not immediately affected
by the wrongdoing—may not have the standing (or physical ability) to forgive the offender in the
sense of saying I forgive you, I will argue it is necessary for them to take a moral position on the
matter, manifest in the attitude of resentment. Because the act was so appalling that it can be
counted as a societal injury, respect for others—respect for the integrity of the moral
community—must be paramount when evaluating such acts. The Holocaust, and the internment
and mass murders of six million Jews, is the uncontested example of this kind of evil. But I fear
to expound an argument based on the monstrous deeds executed by the Nazis deserves more
134
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complete treatment than I can possibly give it here. For the sake of brevity and clarity, I will use
a fictional example, but one that will, I hope, clearly demonstrate the importance of respect for
others in the moral community as a condition for the morality of forgiveness. In the following
example, to forgive—to overcome one’s hatred of the act and disregard the threat this would
pose to the moral community—would be wicked, if not more wicked, than the original evil.
In Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, Ivan Karamazov recalls a graphic and
troubling story of the death of an innocent child:
One day a serf-boy, a little child of eight, threw a stone in play and hurt the paw of the
General's favorite hound. ‘Why is my favorite dog lame?' He is told that the boy threw a
stone that hurt the dog's paw. 'So you did it.' The general looked the child up and down.
'Take him.' He was taken—taken from his mother and kept shut up all night. Early that
morning the general comes out on horseback, with the hounds, his dependents, dog-boys,
and huntsmen, all mounted around him in full hunting parade. The servants are
summoned for their edification, and in front of them all stands the mother of the child.
The child is brought from the lock-up. It's a gloomy, cold, foggy, autumn day, a capital
day for hunting. The general orders the child to be undressed; the child is stripped naked.
He shivers, numb with terror, not daring to cry… 'Make him run,' commands the general.
'Run! Run!' shout the dog-boys. The boy runs…'At him!' yells the general, and he sets the
whole pack of hounds on the child. The hounds catch him, and tear him to pieces before
his mother's eyes…Well—what did he deserve?
‘Shoot him!’ Alyosha said.135
What can Alyosha’s response tell us about the nature of unforgivability? It is important to
note that his desire to “shoot him” should be taken here to represent a general inability to
overcome hatred and not a suggestion that resentment is the same thing as retribution. The
General, by the fundamentally immoral nature of his act, is indelibly marked by it. And Alyosha
is not in a position to go to the General and offer forgiveness (or claim to withhold it). His
response represents a respect for the shared principles of basic morality that form the
underpinnings of the moral community, and thus reluctance—perhaps even an inability—to
overcome that hatred. Merilys Lewis has argued that this is a “powerful moral protest against
135
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innocent suffering, against the irreducible and unjustifiable evil in human life…she has no right
to forgive the torturer for that even if her child were to forgive him.”136 Proponents of resentment
hold that there can be something villainous and despicable about someone who would deny the
resentful response to certain crimes.137

3. The Unapologetic
The final instance in which I believe it is necessary to withhold forgiveness is in the case
of the unapologetic offender. It is easy to imagine that when the offender is unrepentant that
offering forgiveness could be construed as condoning or overlooking the injury, reducing the
whole process to “letting go.” And, because I have argued that inherent in forgiveness is the
condemnation of a wrong, if the unapologetic offender refuses to satisfy the condition that the
injury is acknowledged as wrong, then forgiveness should be off the table.
We might wonder what consequences this will have for the injured person. Has he or she
been burdened further by the aggressor’s unwillingness to repent? Assuming for now that the
offender is alive and able to offer repentance if only he or she was willing, it would be morally
irresponsible to offer forgiveness. Consider again the rapist. If he refused to admit what he did
was wrong, we can again take the evil nature of his deed to be a reflection of a defect or
deficiency in his morality. I argued above that forgiveness and resentment both require that the
transgression remains integral to forgiveness. Without an understanding that the act was wrong,
and should not be repeated, we cannot expect the conditions of self-respect and respect for the
moral community to be satisfied.
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The offender cannot be forgiven if the injured party bears in mind the principles of selfrespect—there is a lack of evidence that the wrongdoer has the capacity, or willingness, to
change. In a situation where the offender has experienced no “change of heart,” then to restore
the “moral relationship that existed prior to the injury would be to accept the wrongdoer qua
offender into a relationship of moral equality.”138
To offer forgiveness where none has been asked for is to reduce forgiveness to a
psychological need to “let go” of the burden of resentment.139 This release may feel like
forgiveness; the injured parties might believe they have done themselves a favor, but they have
not forgiven—this could only be a pretense of forgiving, for there was no one to forgive!
The injunction to forgive an unapologetic person might be based on a fundamental belief
that all people are good, or that the offer of forgiveness may inspire contrition, or that it will
make us feel better. Religious notions of “faith” suggest faith allows the injured “to admit the
behavioral evidence is against decency, but to ‘believe in’ the wrongdoer’s decency anyhow.”140
But is this self-deception not a blatant form of self-disrespect? The forgiveness offered out of
such faith is based more on hope than it is on fact, and because it sets aside self-respect in the
name of “feeling better” or “letting go;” no matter how therapeutic it may be, how virtuous is
this kind of forgiveness? It cannot be said that any hurdle has been overcome, that any work has
been done in order to overcome hatred and resentment in a meaningful and lasting way. In this
way, forgiveness seems no more virtuous than forgetfulness. The virtuosity of forgiveness hinges
on the power of forgiveness to overcome transgressions, so long as it allows the forgiver to
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maintain self-respect and respect for others. Otherwise, as I have shown, resentment should
persist.
If an injured person forgives the unrepentant in order to avoid the problem or move on
quickly, he or she is self-defeating. Not only is his or her change of heart not likely to last,141 but
also the wrongdoer does not have a right to our forgiveness. Despite plenty of arguments to the
contrary, forgiveness is not a gift,142 nor is it a right of the offender to receive forgiveness. The
virtuosity of forgiveness is undermined when agency (or work) is removed in offering
forgiveness; there was no obstacle of repentance or resentment for either party to overcome.
There does not seem to be anything virtuous about forgiving someone who is not remorseful; at
best, this is mere catharsis, and at worst, it is collusion with the wrong itself.

Counter arguments
It might be suggested that to withhold forgiveness when the act of forgiving would
compromise the victim’s self-respect does not account for the ways in which forgiveness could
be enacted without a return to the status quo. The argument claims that it is possible “to forgive
and, at the same time, remove oneself from a relationship in which one expects to suffer future
harms.”143 If forgiveness, as suggested by Glen Pettigrove, is not tied necessarily to
reconciliation, then there must be room for forgiveness without restoring whatever relationships
were damaged.
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This argument returns us to the problem of “letting go,” or that the entire virtuous process
of overcoming resentment can be reduced to the psychological desire to alleviate the burden of
anger. This is undoubtedly primary in the motivations to forgive, and I would not dispute that
there is truth to Pettigrove’s claim—particularly when the wrongdoer is remote (i.e.,
unreachable, imprisoned), when the offender was a stranger (i.e., rapist), or when a group
committed the injury (i.e., Nazis).
But my argument is based on the virtue, not the therapeutic value, of forgiveness.
Forgiving someone when reconciliation is not possible or desired may be of immense
psychological value, but can we say that it is virtuous? The reasons one arrives at emotional
relief are important. Jesse Couenhoven has argued that moral concerns—not the mere
instrumental ones—give the proper context for forgiveness.144 In other words, if the reasons one
forgives are merely instrumental (therapeutic), then the outcome may look like forgiveness, but it
is in fact taking forgiveness to be less than what it really is. The virtuosity of forgiveness seems
to stem from the moral and ethical effort put into overcoming resentment and demanding selfrespect. Pettigrove’s argument addresses the kind of forgiveness that is “letting go” or “moving
on,” and thus it is unable to account for virtuous nature of unconditional forgiveness.
Withholding forgiveness because it would be immoral to the moral community is not
based on a misunderstanding of forgiving as condoning. Those who argue this have questioned
the belief that being unforgiving is the only way to condemn the injury.145 However, I have
already pointed out the possible confusion about what forgiveness is by explaining that it is not
pardoning, excusing, or condoning, and that the transgression must remain central to the process.
I agree with Wolfendale that unforgiving is not the only way to condemn the wrong, but I
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disagree that this somehow counts against the unforgivable attitude as a more virtuous response
in some cases. The idea that it is immoral to forgive certain evils, particularly when the laws of
the moral community are at stake, is not about showing condemnation; it is based on an inability
to separate the (im)moral content of the act from the perpetrator.
In other words, to say the only purpose of withholding forgiveness is to condemn the act
is to misunderstand why I think forgiveness should sometimes be withheld. It is not to make a
statement about the wrongness of the act—that is inherent (or should be) to the process
already—there is no purpose to the unforgiving attitude. It is a response, a reaction to a certain
type of evil, and is a response in accordance to principles of self-respect and respect for others.
Maintaining an unforgiving attitude under the conditions I have explicated has no purpose in the
way Wolfendale might suggest and tries to make no statement. Rather, it is merely the most
morally responsible approach under specific circumstances, so that condoning and condemning
have little to do with it. Again, the fact that forgiveness and resentment are being considered
already implies the act has been condemned and will remain condemned throughout the entire
process.
Of course, the proponents of forgiveness might argue that my insistence that resentment
can be a better response than forgiveness when the wrongdoer is unapologetic will perpetuate a
cycle of anger and hate. Glen Pettigrove has written about “consequence-driven” objections to
forgiveness—broadly, this is the idea that forgiving the unapologetic may lead to an undesirable
consequence.146 Because Pettigrove’s discussion of this type of objection to forgiveness closely
mirrors what I imagine an argument against my own claims would be, it will be useful to
explicate what he finds troubling about objections these forgiveness.
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Pettigrove’s primary qualm with an argument, like mine, that advocates resentment,
reflects Joseph Butler’s observation in his sermon. Butler wrote, “Resentment towards any man
hath plainly a tendency to beget the same passion in him who is the object of it; and this again
increases it in the other.”147 Resentment, when expressed to the wrongdoer by the victim, is
likely to incite a reaction of resentment in the wrongdoer toward the victim, which will in turn
provoke a bitter and endless cycle of anger. Pettigrove has argued that, by conditioning
forgiveness such that the wrongdoer must be repentant (my third argument), one fails to
recognize the potential positive consequences of forgiving the unapologetic suggested by
Butler.148
At this point, after I have addressed several counter arguments to my conditions for
forgiveness, it would be useful to delineate the difference between resentment and revenge,
because I can imagine general opposition to my account of the virtue of resentment being based
on an understanding of resentment as synonymous with revenge.
Resentment, as with other attitudes, can of course be taken to excess or be misdirected.
Butler’s fear was that resentment is an emotion that can be dangerous for its owner.149
Resentment can be painful and distressing; it can interfere with personal relationships, and can
dominate a person’s life.150 But this kind of unconditional resentment is not the qualified kind to
which I have been referring. Revenge, a potential consequence of excessive resentment, is not in
question here. Revenge implies action and a calculated reactive response to an injury.
Resentment understood in this paper has lacked the retributive quality associated with revenge. I
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have argued that forgiveness is the overcoming of resentment, and in turn, when forgiveness
cannot be offered in congruency with moral principles, resentment should persist.
The persistence of resentment, then, is distinct from the cultivation and acting out of
vengeance. Conceivably an objection could be lodged against my argument that is concerned
with the possibility of violence and hostility when forgiveness is withheld. I would respond to
this in two ways. First, I would maintain that there is a difference between revenge (which might
include violence) and resentment. The former is an act; the latter is an attitude. I am not
promoting the sort of excessive resentment that could lead to retributive action. Granted, there
may be no way of controlling this, and long-term resentment may manifest itself in vengeful
acts. Nevertheless, I would argue that resentment has its place, conditionally, just as forgiveness
has its place, conditionally.
I would also clarify that this discussion has not centered on mere interpersonal
indiscretions or everyday gaffes and insults. The idea that some acts are unforgiveable, and their
effect on the offender is irreversible, pertains to extreme, horrific atrocities. Average conflicts, I
would argue, are generally forgivable, since—they can be resolved without jeopardizing moral
principles. Rather, the kind of evil with which I am concerned is the kind that threatens hope,
ethics, social stability, and faith. The consequences are far from trivial—to forgive evil of this
caliber may be equally as wicked as the act itself because it is a major affront to our humanity.

Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to look more closely at the relationship between
forgiveness and resentment, and to question the popular theological and philosophical treatment
of forgiveness as an unconditional virtue. I have argued that the way in which forgiveness can,
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and should be, conditioned—by a certain constellation of circumstances—to be morally
acceptable. When one can offer forgiveness and still maintain self-respect, respect for others and
the moral community, and when the offender is repentant, then I believe forgiveness can be
considered virtuous. If one of more of these conditions is unmet, then I maintain forgiveness
cannot be rightly considered virtuous.
I have attempted to demonstrate that because no person is infallible, and because time is
irreversible, we are constantly faced with the problem of resolution. Of the two attitudinal
options available to us—forgivingness or resentfulness—forgivingness is often purported to be
the better option. It is, some have argued, more conducive to psychological peace, societal peace,
and congruent with the tenets of Christian doctrine. The forgiving attitude, embedded in an ethic
of Divine Command through Biblical injunctions to forgive our enemies, and confidence in the
ultimate goodness of all of humanity, has been adopted by philosophical, sociological, and
psychological rhetoric. A consequence of this, I have argued, is that forgiveness has been revered
as an unconditional virtue across theological and philosophical lines.
The challenge of this project was to demonstrate the ways in which this might not always
be true. To be sure, forgiveness has its merits. However, my argument has been that in certain
circumstances of grave, dehumanizing evil, forgiveness is not virtuous insofar as unconditional
forgiveness cannot always be beneficial for the forgiver, or willed to be a universal good.
Because forgiveness and resentment operate in tandem, when forgiveness is withheld because it
cannot be morally justified, then resentment is a more virtuous attitude. This is not to say that
resentment is easier, or more cathartic, or will lead to reconciliation—it is certainly a difficult
position to maintain. Nevertheless, unconditional forgiveness for the type of transgressions I
have in mind has its own dangers which I believe are more perilous for the moral community
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than the consequences of resentment. At the outset, I asked what happens when a sense of moral
responsibility is impossible to reconcile with forgiveness? Ultimately, I believe that this paper
has presented a compelling argument that resentment can be the answer to this problem.
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